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T
he term London interbank offer rate (Libor) is the
rate at which banks indicate they are willing to lend
to other banks for a specified term of the loan. The
term overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate is the rate on a
derivative contract on the overnight rate. (In the United
States, the overnight rate is the effective federal funds rate.)
In such a contract, two parties agree that one will pay the
other a rate of interest that is the difference between the
term OIS rate and the geometric average the overnight
federal funds rate over the term of the contract. The term
OIS rate is a measure of the market’s expectation of the
overnight funds rate over the term of the contract. There
is very little default risk in the OIS market because there
is no exchange of principal; funds are exchanged only at
the maturity of the contract, when one party pays the net
interest obligation to the other.
The term Libor-OIS spread is assumed to be a measure
of the health of banks because it reflects what banks believe
is the risk of default associated with lending to other banks.
Indeed, former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan stated
recently that the “Libor-OIS
remains a barometer of fears of
bank insolvency.” He then noted
that “that fear has been substan-
tially reduced since mid-October,
but the decline has stalled well
short of any semblance of normal
markets,” suggesting that the
still-high Libor-OIS spreads were
an indication of problems in the
banking industry. There is no
doubt that changes in the Libor-
OIS spread reflect changes in
risk premiums rather than
changes in liquidity premiums—
premiums that reflect banks’
desire for liquidity: The differ-
ence between the rate on term
certificates of deposit (CD) and
the equivalent-term Libor rate is
very small. If banks were liquid-
ity constrained, borrowing banks would have to pay a high-
er rate when they borrow from each other than when they
borrow in the CD market, where lenders are not “liquidity
constrained.”
Risks premiums generally tend to increase in an environ-
ment of increased uncertainty, such as periods of financial
turmoil and recession. In the case of recession, the risk
premium increases because the rate on the default-risk-free
asset falls relative to the rate for the risky asset as interest
rates decline—there is a flight to safety.
Figure 1 shows the daily term Libor-OIS spreads for
terms of 1, 3, and 6 months: There was a sharp rise in the
term spreads on August 9, 2007, after a lengthy period of
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Figure 1being small and relatively constant.
Indeed, there was little difference
in the spreads across terms of the
assets. This sharp rise in the term
spreads is associated with market
concerns that problems in the sub-
prime mortgage market were
spreading to the broader mortgage
market. These term spreads fluctu-
ated around a much higher level
until September 17, 2008, following
the announcement that Lehman
Brothers had filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. The spreads increased
to very high levels—about 350
basis points—for a period after the
Lehman announcement, but have
subsequently narrowed. Indeed,
the 1-month Libor-OIS spread on
April 6, 2009, was about 28 basis
points, only about 15 basis points
higher than it was before early August 2007. However, the
3- and 6-month Libor-OIS spreads remain much higher
than they were before the Lehman announcement.
It appears that the spreads reflect the market’s perception
of increased risk endemic to the economy more generally.
Figure 2 shows the 6-month Libor-OIS spread and the
spread between the rate on 6-month AAA-rate corporate
bonds and the 6-month T-bill rate. The spread between
lower-rated corporate bonds and equivalent-maturity
Treasuries behaves similarly; however, the spread is much
wider. The 6-month corporate-Treasury spread reflects the
risk premium in the economy generally. Both risk premiums
increased dramatically in early August 2007. Hence, news
that the subprime problems were spreading beyond the
subprime market appears to have affected risk premiums
in the economy generally and not simply the banking indus-
try. Moreover, both risk premiums rose dramatically on
news of Lehman’s bankruptcy. Perhaps not surprisingly
the Libor-OIS spread increased somewhat more than the
corporate-Treasury spread. Both spreads remain elevated
relative to their pre-August 2007 levels, which likely reflects
the concerns associated with the recession. The fact that
the Libor-OIS spread has averaged about 40 to 50 basis
points more suggests that the risks might now be somewhat
higher in banking than the economy more generally. How  -
ever, this interpretation suggests that risks have risen more
so in the banking industry despite considerable efforts of
the government and the Fed to aid that industry.
Finally, it is worth noting that there was considerable
variation in the 6-month corporate-Treasury spread relative
to the Libor-OIS spread before August 2007. Indeed, the
Libor-OIS spread was very small and nearly constant. This
behavior is consistent with the idea that financial markets
were not adequately gauging the risk associated with mort-
gage lending during the period. ￿
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Figure 2